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41 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In its final report of 1999 on EU preparations for the Year 2000 (Y2K)
Computing Problem, the European Commission has compiled information from
various sources, including EU governments and the Infrastructure Providers
Workshop which it hosted at the end of September 1999.
Countries and sectors throughout the EU now report that their preparations
are essentially complete, and that the rigorous contingency plans which they
have established to cope with exceptional events have been tested and reinforced
to cope with possible Y2K problems. They consider themselves to be ready and
expect no material disruption to their operations. Their confidence is supported
by the unprecedented degree of industry and private-public collaboration which
has taken place during 1999 to address this issue. Indeed, many believe that their
ability to detect and respond to problems which may occur at year end is now
greater than at any other time.
Nevertheless, although dealing with the technical problem at the root of the
“millennium bug” has been a generally straightforward, if resource-intensive and
time-consuming, task, resolving the related business and political issues has
been much more difficult. It is in this area where certain issues remain.
Having achieved individual readiness, organisations must then ensure the
reliability of their supply chains. Understandably, given the difficulty and
expense of auditing other companies, the determination of external supplier
compliance is a process which is frequently obliged to rely upon unvalidated
supplier claims. This increases the need to have effective business continuity
plans in place. Equally important is the exercising of these plans under various
simulated conditions. Those who have already carried out this step confirm the
benefits of training and drilling in real-life situations.
As organisations finalise their contingency preparations during the final quarter
of 1999, many plan to implement internal “crisis cells” or “command centres”,
joining sectoral, national and global networks to exchange information on the
situation. In general, these efforts are focused on the critical period following
midnight on 31 December 1999. Nevertheless, normal operations and peak loads
may not occur until the first working day of the year, with the full impact of any
problems requiring days, weeks or even months to become apparent.
Organisations should thus consider retaining a certain increased level of
monitoring and capacity to react throughout next year.
The intensive remediation and replacement of IT systems which has taken place
during 1999 has already resulted in numerous reports of the millennium bug
“biting”. It seems inevitable that widespread changes to IT systems on such a
large scale will create its own problems, many of which are only indirectly
attributable to the Y2K problem itself. At this stage, the effect is primarily
irritating, but an increased volume of such incidents occurring during a short
time period may place a heavy demand on resources, and possibly lead to
unjustified concerns regarding the actual effect of the Y2K problem.
The uniqueness of the Y2K problem lies in its global, pervasive nature, and the
inability to predict its ultimate consequences. This uncertainty, both in terms of
the impact of the problem and of the reaction of the public, is now the
greatest concern in the EU, as elsewhere. Thus far, the EU public appears to
5feel sufficiently well informed but not unduly concerned, and this situation is
undoubtedly due to the intensive efforts made by governments and industry to
provide them with reliable and useful information.
The key to retaining public confidence during the run-up to the new
millennium, as well as at the beginning of next year, will depend upon the
close monitoring of public and media opinion, and managing their
expectations. A successful communication strategy will require a sustained
continuous effort from the many organisations involved, working together.
A final concern of governments is the possibility of serious disruptions
occurring in less prepared countries. The normal humanitarian organisations
have recognised this possibility and are gearing themselves up to provide aid if it
should prove necessary. At the same time, there may be a need to assist these
countries in restoring normal services. The International Y2K Co-operation
Centre, working with various governments and organisations, including the G8,
is examining how support for reconstitution efforts could be made globally
available.
2 INTRODUCTION
In its final report for the third quarter of 1999, the European Commission
provides an overview of the current situation of major infrastructures in the EU,
highlighting their preparations and identifying how issues are receiving attention.
These communications have been produced on a quarterly basis since December
1998 and reveal how the situation continues to progress and evolve.
Once again, the report contents are based upon information provided by the
relevant administrations, regulatory and supervisory authorities in the Member
States, as well as by European and international associations. Countries which
made specific contributions include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Substantial information was collected during the Infrastructure Providers
Workshop hosted by the Commission at the end of September 1999. The overall
reporting timeframe was September to mid-October 1999.
The particular industry sectors to be reported on were selected for their economic
and social importance, and their relevance in a cross-border context. In this
respect, it is important to note the collaboration which has taken place within the
EU between the government and industry bodies dealing with the Y2K problem.
Regular workshops have been hosted by the Commission since 1997. The
Cologne Summit conclusions requested the Commission to convene a high-level
working party to “…put forward proposals for strategic decisions which may
be required within the European Union to ensure the proper functioning of
essential areas of infrastructure should computer problems arise in connection
with the change of millennium.”
This group has now met on three occasions and discussed various issues,
including nuclear safety, strategies for communication with the public,
consistency between national contingency plans, and the implementation of a
communication system between EU Member States during the rollover period. It
will continue to meet on a monthly basis until the end of the year, and possibly
thereafter.
The final report on EU
preparedness for
1999…
…contains information
collected from both the
public and private
sectors…
…with a particular
focus on cross-border
issues and activities
Close collaboration on
Y2K matters continues
to take place within the
EU…
6The role of the Commission is to facilitate the exchange of information on the
Y2K problem by collecting and publishing information. It is not possible to carry
out an independent assessment of the information which has been received.
Moreover, the infrastructure sectors described in this report are interdependent,
and within the EU, such organisations may be publicly owned or private, some
are closely regulated, and in certain countries there will be a single major player,
whereas in others there may be hundreds of companies of various sizes.
It is thus inevitable that in such a report at EU level, the overview of the
preparedness of these sectors must remain rather superficial. It is for this reason
that an extensive list of website addresses is included in the annex, for those
interested in specific organisations and sectors to obtain more detailed
information.
3 ENERGY
3.1 Electricity
3.1.1 Overview
The electricity supply industry reports that their remediation efforts to ensure
that systems are Y2K compliant, to the extent which this is possible, are now
complete, or nearing completion. Their current work thus concentrates on
finalising contingency plans. In fact, the electricity supply industry, which must
continually match the supply of electricity with demand under constantly
changing conditions, normally operates on a de facto contingency basis, although
much greater attention is now being given to the date change period.
The electricity supply industry in Western Europe, as represented by Unipede /
Eurelectric and UCTE, recently reaffirmed their commitment to “Business as
Usual” in the supply of electricity and the maintenance of electricity supply
quality. Behind this commitment are extensive preparations which the industry
has been undertaking over a number of years. These have been described in detail
and co-ordinated between supply companies through the regular quarterly
meetings organised by the industry association, Unipede/Eurelectric, with the
most recent meeting held on 15 September.
With respect to electricity links between countries, a policy has been agreed
within UCTE for these connections to be maintained in operation, though with
minimum electricity flows at the rollover period. This is consistent with
contractual and other obligations, so that electricity flows can be increased if
assistance by one party is required. This policy has also been adopted by the
CENTREL grid, which is connected to the UCTE grid, with similar
arrangements also being applied to the separate Nordel grid.
The importance of maintaining the continuity of the electricity grid, which is an
essential link in the supply chain from power stations to customers, has been
recognised. Moreover, the sudden loss of several large generating units, or of
very large customers, would tend to destabilise the grid, which, if seriously
affected, could create further problems. Due to the importance of the grid to
electricity supply, the Commission organised a workshop in Brussels on 22 July
with the major grid operators across Europe, including the CEEC and NIS and
other interested parties, for a comprehensive discussion on this particular issue.
…with the Commission
acting as a facilitator
for the exchange of
information
This EU overview
suggests links to
sources of more
detailed information
The EU electricity
supply industry reports
that it is essentially
ready…
…as a result of
extensive preparations
and active co-
ordination at European
level
There is agreement to
maintain cross-border
electricity flows during
the rollover period
Continuity of electricity
grids has been an issue
of particular concern…
7An additional consideration is that potential instabilities in electrical frequency
could be induced by large losses. These instabilities could cause power plants to
disconnect from the grid, thus further reducing supply and increasing the risk of
disruption of the grid. Such disconnections of a nuclear power plant (NPP) would
require stand-by electric power (alternative grid connections and local back-up
generators are standard features of any NPP) to be activated to support the
essential functions of the NPP. A similar workshop on electricity grids, and in
particular the interface with nuclear power plants for CEEC and NIS, was
organised by the IAEA in Bulgaria on 13-15 September.
The results of these workshops have demonstrated that the electricity supply
industry is fully aware of the key importance of maintaining grid continuity,
including the particular issues relating to NPPs, to which they have been devoting
much attention. In general terms, electricity grids are electro-mechanical in
nature and not directly date sensitive, although information and control systems
may be. Efforts have therefore been focused on such systems, and on
communications in general, which are essential to the operation of electricity
supply. Electricity firms are organising back-up communication facilities in
addition to the dedicated networks which are typical of the industry, to ensure
continuous operation in the event of the congestion or failure of externally
provided communications.
Other measures are also foreseen. Reserves of instantaneously available
generating capacity (spinning reserves) will be considerably increased above
normal margins, to cope with the possible failure of an on-line generating plant.
The reserve generating capacity will be diversified in terms of both fuel and
location, to give additional security and to minimise possible strains on electricity
grids. Supplies of different fuels for generating plant and fuel stocks will be
assured. Planned outages of plant or other key items such as transformers will be
avoided as much as possible, with maintenance completed well beforehand.
Reports also indicate that staffing will be significantly increased for the rollover
period, with experienced staff trained in contingency situations, and the plans
themselves tested through drills. These contingency plans must be capable of
dealing with external failures such as in telecommunications or fuel supplies, as
well as internal failures.
With New Year’s Day falling on a Saturday and forming part of a holiday
period, electricity demand is expected to be significantly below winter peak
levels, when industry and commerce is in full operation. This will also depend on
the weather, which in northern and central Europe can be very severe. Many
electricity companies have been in close contact with their large consumers, to
gain prior knowledge of their expected demand during the rollover period. Rapid
fluctuations in demand are the most difficult to handle, hence the utilities are
dissuading people from switching to stand-by generators just before the rollover,
and then returning to public supply just afterwards, as this tends to destabilise
the system. It is useful for electricity suppliers to know when demand will
increase back to normal levels, on the 3 or 4 January, or even later, as industry
and commerce return to normal levels of activity. Utilities are prepared for
possible problems in these periods, as the infrastructure comes into use at full
load for the first time in the new millennium.
… with respect to the
potential impact of grid
failure on nuclear
power plants
Contingency plans to
ensure grid continuity
include back-up
telecommunication
facilities,…
…additional reserve
generating capacity and
fuel stocks,…
…and working with
customers to minimise
significant fluctuations
in demand
8The wider public and smaller enterprises need to be informed that the electricity
supply industry is fully committed to business as usual and has undertaken very
extensive measures to fulfil this commitment. To some extent, this is to
discourage unusual behaviour which could in itself create problems, although this
is less of a problem for electricity than other sectors. Nevertheless, the supply
industry and national administrations must keep the public well informed.
3.1.2 Preparations in the EU
Many of the large electricity suppliers in the EU are now reporting the
completion of their compliance activities. In Sweden, Svenska Kraftnät noted that
very few serious problems had been discovered, indeed, none of their systems
would have resulted in power supply interruptions or the disconnection of any
grid component, even had no action been taken. To place this in context, they
also reported that the normal average frequency of disturbances to the national
grid alone is once every other day. These disturbances occur when an automatic
protection system is activated and causes the disconnection of a grid component,
which rarely leads to interruptions in customer supply. Similar findings are
reported by other electricity companies throughout the EU.
Sweden has also carried out a detailed examination of the possible impact of
Y2K on district heating, which included an assessment of the risks associated
with building systems used to control, regulate, and optimise the climate. They
reported that non-compliant systems were discovered in approximately 6% of
buildings. In particular, the study tried to identify non-compliant systems which
would malfunction if no action was taken. In none of cases examined would such
systems have resulted in a loss of heating, although there was a risk of financial
consequences. The majority of the electricity produced in Austria is from
hydroelectric power stations, which are considered to be less sensitive to the Y2K
problem than thermal power stations, and moreover have a shorter start-up time
following a breakdown. Scenarios and action plans have been developed to take
into account different water levels, energy demand, grid problems and their effect
on hydro power stations.
In Belgium, the electricity sector (all producers and the national grid) conducted
a successful exercise on the 9/9/99 to test the organisation planned for the
rollover. The objective was to ensure that all participants understood their roles
and reacted appropriately to simulated events, and that communication worked
effectively. A second rehearsal is scheduled before year-end to fine-tune the
preparations.
3.2 Natural Gas
Natural gas is also considered a vital resource, especially for heating, and the gas
supply industry in Europe has similarly devoted considerable effort to assure
supply continuity. Again, remediation work by the supply industry in the EU is
complete or nearing completion, with the emphasis now on finalising contingency
plans. As with other major energy forms, and given the importance of energy
supply as a whole, extensive contingency plans already exist for the gas sector
and these form the basis of the plans for the millennium date change.
Indeed, about 43% of the EU’s gas supplies are imported, mainly from Norway,
Algeria and Russia. Thus to assure normal security of supply, the substantial
measures in place include storage, flexible supply arrangements with indigenous
producers, and interruptible supply contracts with large consumers. These are
being adapted as appropriate to deal with failures caused by Y2K. In addition, all
Nevertheless, the wider
public needs to be made
fully aware of the
situation and plans
EU findings indicate
that the Y2K impact on
the electricity sector
appears to be
minimal,…
…and Y2K is also
unlikely to provoke
problems in building
heating systems
Some EU countries are
also exercising their
rollover plans
The gas sector has
reached a similar state
of preparedness
Given the EU’s reliance
on foreign gas
supplies,…
9vital installations will be manned, local emergency power supplies will be
maintained on stand-by, alternative telecommunication lines and private radio
networks are being established, and stand-by personnel will be reinforced.
With respect to upstream suppliers, the gas companies are in continuing dialogue
with their external suppliers in order to exchange information, identify problems,
and co-operate in finding solutions, with the overall aim of avoiding interruptions
to gas flow. It has been confirmed that external suppliers are co-operating fully,
and are reported to be addressing the issue very professionally.
One issue, first raised at Infrastructure Providers Workshop held in April this
year with representatives of the gas supply industry in Europe, was the extent to
which different gas supply companies’ contingency plans are compatible with
each other, particularly regarding cross-border flows in the event of possible
interruptions to external supplies. The Commission wrote to the European gas
companies’ association Eurogas, seeking further assurances on this issue.
In response to these enquiries, the dispatching officers of companies in the
Eurogas member countries met to further discuss and co-ordinate their activities.
In addition to confirming the extensive preparations which the gas companies
have made, including special attention to critical services such as
telecommunications, power supply, and upstream natural gas deliveries, the
companies also reported on the enhanced preparation and co-ordination of their
contingency plans, including the cross-border dimension.
3.3 Oil
Oil supply is equally vital to a modern economy, notably for transportation and
heating. Moreover, net oil imports, mainly crude oil, account for about 80% of
total consumption in the EU. However, a number of significant factors mitigate
the risk of interruption to supply resulting from Y2K problems.
Firstly, crude oil and oil products are readily stored throughout the supply chain,
including the storage of heating oil by domestic consumers. To ensure general
security of supply, EU legislation requires Member States to store the equivalent
of at least 90 days consumption of oil, held by the industry and/or specially
created oil storage agencies. Further EU legislation covers the use and release of
oil stocks and related measures in case of oil supply difficulties.
A second factor tending to mitigate the vulnerability to Y2K of the sector is the
diversity of oil supply, in terms both of companies operating in competition to
supply consumers, and of supply infrastructure, which can occur by pipeline,
rail, barge and road tanker. The third factor is, as with other energy supply
industries, the very extensive work carried out over several years by the oil
supply industry on remediation and contingency planning.
It is thus likely that component failures in supply systems which may arise from
Y2K problems should be surmountable by the security stocks and other
contingency measures in place. Nevertheless, there is a need to monitor the
situation as the year end approaches, primarily due to the nature of the oil
market. A key aspect is the role, in the short term, of market perceptions, and
linked to this, the relative volatility of oil prices.
It is therefore important that the oil supply industry takes the measures necessary
to prevent shortages of specific products such as motor fuel, which could suffer
from a surge in purchases as the year end approaches. More generally, the oil
stocks and associated measures required under EU legislation should be in a high
…gas companies are
working closely with
external suppliers
The issue of cross-
border compatibility
between contingency
plans…
…is receiving attention
at European level
In spite of the strong
dependency on oil
imports in the EU,…
…significant oil stocks
exist in accordance with
EU legislation ,…
…there is great
diversity in both supply
and the supply
infrastructure, …
…and the extensive
efforts of the oil
industry should
altogether reduce the
impact of any supply
disruptions
Nevertheless, managing
public confidence is a
key issue for the oil
industry as well
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state of readiness, to be able to deal appropriately with any possible major supply
problems, either internally or externally, which could arise around the date
change period. Equally, the public should be informed of the very extensive
measures in place for such an eventuality, in part to discourage possible harmful
behaviour. The EU, and in a broader context the International Energy Agency
(IEA), are currently examining these issues and the need for further steps, such
as prior agreement on stockdraw in certain circumstances, which may be required
to address them.
As an example, Irish Department of Public Enterprise has a role in response to
oil supply disruptions generally. In addition to the maintenance of formal national
plans (currently under review) to deal with major supply disruptions, the
Department has a proven capability to facilitate the co-ordination of an industry-
wide response to more localised interruptions. This response draws on the
expertise and resources of the oil companies, individually and collectively, the
Irish National Petroleum Corporation 's trading and refining operations and the
National Oil Reserves Agency. These arrangements have provided a flexible and
effective response to the two serious interruptions in oil supplies which took
place in recent years, and would be capable of speedy implementation in the
event of a residual Y2K disruption.
4 NUCLEAR SAFETY
4.1 Overview
There are a number of potential problems in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
relating to safety that can be associated with the Y2K problem. The first of these
are the direct safety issues, which concern the software, hardware, and embedded
chips used in safety-related systems. The relationship between power plants and
the electricity grid or other generation facilities may also induce problems.
Should grid problems arise, it is important that back-up mechanisms, such as
batteries and diesels, operate to ensure emergency electricity supply to cooling
systems. Finally, there are also concerns that multiple failures, though not
intrinsically unsafe in themselves, could unduly overload NPP operators.
4.2 International Activities on Nuclear Safety
WANO, the World Association of Nuclear Operators, has taken initiatives since
1998 to raise awareness and share information amongst its members. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has launched a special project to
address the Y2K problem for NPPs (particularly in CEEC, NIS and China). It
has performed a number of missions to NPP sites. These have revealed a number
of Y2K issues although these are generally not in safety critical systems. Instead,
they may present a risk to continued operation, and an associated risk of operator
overload. The IAEA plans to undertake further missions but it is limited by the
unavailability of Western experts.
There is previous
experience in coping
with interruptions to oil
supplies
There is a potential
impact of Y2K on
nuclear safety
IAEA missions to
nuclear power plants
have revealed Y2K
issues, but these are not
safety critical
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4.3 EU Nuclear Safety
All Member States with operating NPPs have a programme to address the issue.
Although each programme differs in detail, each requires the licensee to identify
systems that might be affected, to rank them by nuclear safety significance, to
test each in turn and to modify or replace any that fail. Regulatory authorities are
reviewing the content of these programmes and are monitoring their execution.
Some Member State NPP operators reported Y2K readiness at the end of June
1999. Others executed some remediation and test activities during summer
shutdown periods, and all plan to end such work by the end of October. All
Member States’ NPP operators are now preparing risk mitigation and
contingency plans. A number of research reactors will be closed over the critical
dates. Several regulatory authorities plan to conduct inspections during the
autumn, including the examination of contingency plans.
As an example, the Barsebäck nuclear plant in Sweden, a production reactor,
reported that it had discovered fifteen components in its process systems which
required correction. A third of this equipment was critical to plant operations and
was given priority for corrective action, which was completed in April. In
Finland, NPP testing involved resetting system clocks during maintenance breaks
to the year 2000.
The systems and components of all German NPP have been classified according
to their possible impact on safety and plant operation. In total, 11,000 NPP
systems and components were inventoried and checked, of which 120 were found
to be non-compliant. The adjustments to be performed on the systems and
components relevant to safety or availability were concluded by July 1999 and
are in the process of being verified by experts. In German NPPs, safety critical
functions as reactor shut down are based on hard-wired control systems. Their
functional performance is not influenced by the changing of the date. Exceptions
such as digital devices for signal conditioning have been investigated. Some
digital devices concerned with plant safety were remediated, such as the rotation
speed transducers that control the emergency power diesel generators.
The Commission is in regular contact with relevant industrial groups
(FORATOM, WANO, EURELECTRIC, UNIPEDE) for information on their
activities. The Commission has raised the Y2K issue for discussion with Member
State regulators in the relevant working groups, promoting the spread of best
regulatory practice. There is no perceived need to increase the Commission’s
activities with respect to Y2K compliance of NPPs in the Member States, since
they report that they are already adequately addressing the issue.
4.4 Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)
and New Independent States (NIS)
Central and Eastern Countries (CEEC) and New Independent States (NIS) are
reportedly taking measures, however, it appears that the level of awareness and
action is not homogeneous. Given concerns that the preparations of the electricity
sector in these countries tend to be less advanced than those of the EU, the
likelihood of grid problems arising may be greater, increasing the possibility of
problems with ensuring adequate reactor shutdown (cooldown) or of overloading
operators. The Commission July grid conference discussed (see section 2.1. on
Electricity) the impact of Y2K on EU, CEEC and NIS grids and possibilities for
international co-operation, although no concrete actions were identified.
The rigorous
programmes in place
throughout the EU,
closely monitored by
regulators, will be
completed by October
Problems in EU NPPs
have been identified
and corrected
Y2K is discussed
regularly with industry
groups
Possible concerns for
CEEC and NIS NPPs
are worsened by the
lack of practical
information
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Considering the tight time scale and the absence of any mandate for the European
Union to take an initiative, the Commission is channelling a major effort on
supporting the IAEA1, WANO2, ISTC3, and STCU4 work.
At the Commission’s request, the issue was addressed at the TACIS on-site
assistance meetings organised by WANO in November 1998 and May 1999. In
December 1998, the Commission requested TACIS on-site assistance contractors
to ensure the Y2K compliance of equipment delivered under EU programmes. In
early 1999, the Commission initiated a new inquiry with all EU utilities involved
in the on-site assistance programme to raise awareness. The most recent on-site
assistance contracts include a provision to address the issue at specific sites. In
the framework of the EU TACIS on-site assistance programme, the issue has
already been taken up by one contractor at Leningrad NPP.
A specific Tacis support project is being implemented by WANO as Tacis
contractor. WANO experts have been visiting designated nuclear power plants in
the Ukraine and Russia. The objective of the project is to perform an independent
review of the Y2K status and to support contingency planning efforts. This is
done in full co-ordination with the IAEA.
The ISTC has established a special fund (2 M$) to assist Russian and NIS
institutions in solving issues related to the Y2K problem, involving individuals
and teams from the former weapon research institutes. A number of project
proposals have recently been approved. These projects, developed with the
participation of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy Minatom and the
Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, will, amongst others, provide direct
support to nine nuclear power plants and for the evaluation of nuclear fuel cycle
installations. Funding is directed to co-ordination with Minatom, to equipment,
software and hardware upgrades, and technical expertise. The STCU is
undertaking similar efforts in the Ukraine.
The Commission’s CONCERT group, (consisting of the senior nuclear
regulators of 25 EU, CEEC and NIS countries) has discussed the issue on three
occasions since June 1998 in order to increase awareness. All CEEC and NIS
nuclear regulatory authorities have action plans, several developed following the
first discussion. The content of these plans and their state of progress varies
significantly. Some countries report being as well prepared as their EU
counterparts, while others are significantly less advanced.
Following requests for specific assistance, the Commission is now providing
support to the Bulgarian ,Slovakian, and Russian nuclear regulatory authorities.
The G-24 Nuclear Safety Assistance Co-ordination (NUSAC) secretariat, hosted
by the Commission, raised the Y2K issue at its March 1999 meeting. The
meeting brings together CEEC and NIS countries and the donors of nuclear
safety assistance. The meeting considered the role of donor countries in assessing
the Y2K compliance of equipment that they have supplied.
1 IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency.
2 WANO: World Association of Nuclear Operators.
3 ISTC: International Science and Technology Centre, Moscow, Russian Federation.
4 STCU: Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine.
A number of supporting
programmes for these
nuclear installations
exist
A TACIS project will
carry out an
independent review of
certain NPPs in Russia
and the Ukraine
Special funds are
available to assist
Russian and NIS
institutions
The Commission is
also encouraging the
exchange of information
between nuclear
regulators...
...and providing them
with direct assistance
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The UK Department of Trade and Industry funded a study5, the results of which
were circulated to utilities participating in the TACIS on-site assistance
programme. Finland has provided assistance to the Leningrad NPP near Saint
Petersburg and to the NPP in the Kola peninsula. Representatives from Russian
nuclear power plants have observed the Y2K preparations carried out by the
Loviisa NPP in Finland, which contains Russian-made reactors. Germany is
providing assistance to the Ukrainian regulator and NPPs. Further reports on
bilateral actions have been requested from Member States.
5 TRANSPORT
5.1 Aviation
5.1.1 International Activities in the Aviation Sector
The aviation industry is essentially an international industry, thus the Y2K
activities of international organisations, in which EU industry and regulators
participate, are very important.
On the basis of the Y2K assessment criteria developed by the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), which comprises Air Traffic Services, Airports
and Aircraft Operators, and as decided by the ICAO Assembly, the ICAO
Member States have been providing information on the compliance status of
these services. The original timeframe to respond was 1 July 1999, but replies
have been coming in during the summer, and a number of non-EU States have yet
to report. The non-respondents are generally not considered to have particular
significance for European aviation. The information provided has been made
available by ICAO to authorised officials. In order to have an up-to-date view of
the situation as it develops, this information will be maintained by the States, as
appropriate.
As could be expected, the status of compliance and contingency planning varies
from country to country, and the extent to which the expected target dates within
the last quarter of the year will be met remains an open question. At the same
time, country reports are often incomplete and/or vague in their details, thus in
such cases a full or accurate picture is not available.
A first global readiness status report based on this survey has been prepared by
the ICAO secretariat and made publicly available in the latter part of September.
However, due to the limited mandate given to the secretariat, the report restricts
itself to summary statistics and falls short of providing an assessment of the
situation in the different countries or regions.
In order to ensure that strategic ATS routes remain open, contingency planning
efforts are focusing on providing back-up power and telecom facilities. Eight
regional contingency co-ordination centres will be established to collect and
disseminate information to the countries of their region, permitting corrective
actions of operational contingency measures to overcome any potential
disruptions of ATS. A Global Y2K Co-ordination Unit will be operating in
Montreal.
5 The Millennium Problem. Raising the awareness of nuclear power station operators
and regulatory authorities in Central and Eastern Europe, September 1998
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EUROCONTROL has pursued its activity in the area of Air Traffic
Management, now focusing particularly on the development of contingency
plans. In co-operation with ICAO, Eurocontrol is proceeding with the setting up
of a European Regional Y2K Co-ordination Unit (EUR R Y2K CU). This Unit
will involve experts to address Y2K problems for the entire ICAO European Air
Navigation Region, as well as the interfaces with the other Regions. The Co-
ordination Unit will be physically located in the Central Flow Management Unit
of Eurocontrol in Brussels, where it will operate on 31.12.1999 and 01.01.2000.
A regional "dry-run" exercise on the monitoring and reporting procedures for the
European Region is planned for 11 November 1999.
The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), in whose activities the
Commission participates, has examined the legal aspects of eventual courses of
action being considered in connection with Y2K readiness. They are also
examining possible limitations of operations in cases where there is no
information on compliance status, and/or there is reason to suspect non-
compliance. At an extraordinary meeting of Directors General for Civil Aviation
held on 18 October 1999, it was decided that the ECAC President would address
the states which have not yet replied to ICAO, indicating that the continued
absence of information raises serious questions about permitting flights to/from
these states and flights of their air carriers, and requesting that all expected
information be provided by 26 November.
Furthermore, for countries where the information provided is considered
inadequate, the ECAC Member States were asked to make use of a model letter
in addressing these countries, requesting early consultations so as to resolve all
outstanding issues before the end of November. The DGCA also noted the
possibility to insert in traffic permits reference to potential Y2K problems,
thereby reserving the right to suspend the permit if there is no assurance of Y2K
compliance. The Co-ordinating Committee of ECAC will examine the situation at
the end of November and, if necessary, will convene a special meeting to consider
appropriate action.
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have been pursuing efforts with the ECAC
member states and JAA national authorities concerning outstanding issues, such
as modifications performed by those who are not type certificate holders, and
assessment criteria relating to maintenance organisations. Type certificate
holders have already informed the authorities about the satisfactory completion
of their plans to ensure a safe transition. The JAA will convene a meeting of all
airworthiness authorities of ECAC to cover outstanding issues, and will make
contact with two former Eastern countries to obtain information relative to
aircraft designed in these countries.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has pursued its activity on
the Y2K problem, through the Y2K Industry Project which they established in
June 1998. This focuses on raising awareness, strengthening industry co-
operation, collecting Y2K readiness information, and promoting contingency
planning. Through IATA, the airlines have implemented a programme that
includes air traffic systems and airports, aircraft, engine, and avionics
manufacturers. As part of the project, IATA has been carrying out visits to
certain airports and air traffic control services. IATA has been very reassuring
about the progress which has been made, and is continuing to be made, on Y2K
readiness, and appears confident that the air transport industry will be ready in
time to operate safely, without disruption and with minimal impact on capacity.
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More particularly, as regards aircraft, they do not expect any problems with on-
board equipment that could affect the safe conduct of flight operations.
The Airports Council International (ACI) has co-operated with IATA and
continued its efforts with its members, based on a program to increase
awareness, to share expertise on methods of solving the problems, and to assist
its members in becoming Y2K ready.
5.1.2 Preparations in the EU
The overall picture emerging from available information, particularly the reports
of the representatives of international government and industry organisations at
the Workshop organised by the Commission on 29-30 September, is that the
aviation industry appears well advanced in its preparations to combat potential
problems in European countries, in accordance with plans aimed at achieving
compliance and providing for contingencies that may arise.
European regulators are closely monitoring and assessing the compliance
programmes of their aviation sector. In several cases, this is a substantial task.
The CAA in the UK, for example, currently authorises over 2000 aviation-
related organisations, covering all aspects of the UK civil air transport system
from airlines to manufacturers and air traffic service providers. Each of these
organisations is engaged in their own individual compliance programmes, which
include checking suppliers who may number from tens to hundreds.
Most of the EU’s aviation industry expects to complete its preparations during
the third quarter of 1999. Interface tests are taking place with neighbouring air
traffic service providers. Some sectors are already compliant. Both the UK
National Air Traffic Services (NATS) and the German air traffic control GmbH
(DFS) have completed their programmes and stated that all their systems are
compliant.
In Europe, contingency plans are being based on the normal contingency plans
for the sector and cover immediate safety concerns satisfactorily, however, the
possibility of capacity constraints in the days after the roll over cannot be
excluded. In view of the international nature of aviation, national organisations
are waiting for international plans to be completed before they can finalise their
own plans. Generally, countries will require all aircraft to prove Y2K compliance
and may refuse admission to national airspace where they cannot do so, they will
also insist that national airlines demonstrate that the routes and destinations
which they have chosen to fly to are safe. Operators which are not compliant may
face the suspension of licenses and operations.
In the Netherlands, additional consideration is being given to alleviating the
burden on the national air traffic system by keeping only Schiphol Airport open
on the critical dates, as well as the possibility of keeping regional airports on
stand-by and reserving military airfields for extra capacity. They may also decide
to limit the number of flights by allowing only essential commercial air traffic
and emergency flights, and prohibiting all other flights.
There is confidence regarding the compliance of the Western European industry,
but uncertainty persists concerning the risks associated with cross-border
interactions with regions neighbouring the European Union. Information provided
through the International Civil Aviation Organisation is often either incomplete
or leaves questions open in this respect, and authorities concerned will be trying
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to obtain missing and clear information, so as to be in a position to take measures
that may appear necessary.
5.2 Maritime Transport
Further testing of systems and development of contingency plans has continued
with progress being reported in many areas. The main risk to any ship is to its
ability to navigate safely. The shipping sector has assessed Y2K compliance and
developed a replacement and contingency programme to overcome the potential
problems identified. However, all ships have a built-in contingency mechanism to
cope with the failure of electronic equipment relating to navigation, resulting in
reversion to manual methods. One of the key EU ports, the port of Rotterdam,
has reported that, on the basis of their most recent findings, only 2-3% of vessel
equipment inspected has been found to be non-Y2K compliant, representing a
reduction from the previous estimate of 10%.
From the shipping industry, developments concerning the IMO's Code of Good
Practice were reported, in particular concerning the threat of legal action
resulting from non-implementation of contingency measures. To counter this, the
industry has developed the Y2K Safety Protocol. The aim is to create a
protective climate for those following the Code of Good Practice from legal
liability and commercial pressures through public support from the major
transportation agencies and the understanding of the legal fraternity. To give
legal certainty to the Code and the Protocol, BIMCO has introduced a standard
incorporation clause for charter agreements and bills of lading.
A number of governments have reported progress in the industry. As an example,
the UK’s latest state of play shows its ports to be fully tested and compliant.
Replies to questionnaires sent out to Rotterdam port users in August 1999
showed around 13% to be non-compliant, although this figure is constantly
improving. Ports throughout the EU may close or restrict vessel movements, as
well as operations such as cargo handling and refuelling for a time over the
critical period. Additional safety precautions on shipping entering the port may
also be required.
For instance, non-compliant users will be barred from navigating in the Port of
Rotterdam for a period of 28 hours - the 14 hours immediately preceding and
following midnight on 31 December. Indeed, no ship will be allowed to navigate
on Dutch national waterways during this period unless they can demonstrate
compliance. Furthermore, the Dutch authorities may take additional traffic
measures, including a ban on overtaking, speed limits, the compulsory use of
pilots, a ban on remote piloting, and compulsory assistance from tugs. Additional
conditions may be imposed on particular categories of vessels. Ships with a
potentially hazardous cargo must provide evidence that they are Y2K compliant,
even if they are not sailing. Hazardous substances may only be loaded or
unloaded with the permission of the competent authorities.
5.3 Rail Transport
Rail transport operators and rail infrastructure managers in the EU have,
together with their manufacturers, continued to perform compliance testing.
Contingency plans covering many systems have been reported, and equipment
testing is stated to be going ahead as planned. According to data available from
the International Union of Railways, UIC, and the companies themselves, the
industry appears confident that considerable progress has been achieved. There is
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still much work to be done in all sectors but the general view is that they will be
prepared by year end.
In common with other operators, Deutsche Bahn AG reported various Y2K
activities in progress, such as a project for central (commercial) software and
another to provide central co-ordination. More than 100,000 systems have been
identified and assessed for compliance. An integrated, overall emergency
management project involves all areas of DB AG, including railway stations and
services, travel information and bookings, cargo, and energy. National and
regional monitoring centres for the rollover are being established.
There is, however, a recent tendency to suspend operations over the critical
period (e.g. SNCF and Deutsche Bahn will interrupt their train services from
23.50 to 00.15 hours). According to the information available, this should be
seen as an additional precautionary measure and does not necessarily reflect
concerns regarding compliance. In the Netherlands, no rail transport takes place
during any year end period for several hours before and after midnight on
31 December.
5.4 Road Transport
In most instances, road systems are the responsibility of local authorities, thus
few EU countries are addressing this sector at national level. Countries report
that local authorities are examining their operating equipment and the traffic and
electrical devices controlled by computer programmes. Included are traffic light
systems (controlled by programmes which make use of the calendar), data
acquisition units such as permanent census points and measuring loops with
stops at intervals, equipment affecting traffic flows on motorways and highways,
traffic computer centres, and other operating equipment, such as tunnel
installations, communications equipment, and lighting systems.
An independent assessment has been made of the readiness of all roads in the
UK. For motorways and trunk roads this has been carried out by peer reviews
carried out by the Welsh Office, Scottish Office, the Roads Service, Northern
Ireland and the Highways Agency. Traffic and control equipment on motorways
and trunk roads was found to be clear from risk of material disruption. Road
management systems are nearly ready.
In the private sector, attention is being focused on transport logistics chains, due
to their importance for trade and the economy. The road sector is regarded as a
low risk sector, where the problems which have been identified tend to affect less
critical systems. The members of ASECAP, the association of European
licensees of toll motorways, have examined the possible impact of Y2K on their
activities and have found no critical technological issues. The continued safety of
drivers and of their staff, which is at the top of their priorities, is not in question.
The only problem which has been discovered concerns toll systems. These are
now highly automated and have required a thorough review. ASECAP is thus
confident that all problems have been taken care of and that their systems are
ready.
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6 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The telecommunication infrastructure has been characterised as indispensable,
since it is relied upon by other utility infrastructures such as energy, aviation,
water and gas supply, and underpins business and commerce. Although the core
of the telecommunication infrastructure is very robust and reliable, vulnerabilities
are likely to exist in the infrastructure on business customer premises, which are
not visible to telecommunication providers.
6.1 Key risks/threats/dependencies
Despite the optimism regarding the robustness of the infrastructure, the potential
for congested networks to experience interference in access to emergency
numbers and services remains an issue, primarily due to the possibility of
unusually heavy customer demand occurring at year end. Unlike many other
major infrastructures, telecommunications is one upon which greater than normal
loads are expected over periods such as a New Year. For this year, it is expected
that these loads will be further increased. Telecommunication operators are
addressing this risk, by dimensioning their network capacity both nationally and
internationally to cope with higher load levels.
Congestion will nevertheless continue to be a risk, particularly regarding access
to emergency numbers. Most operators possess the technical means to give
priority to such numbers, but for many countries such a step requires a clear
mandate from regulators and other authorities.
There is another risk associated with unusual patterns of customer demand over
the transition period which could have a negative impact on infrastructures,
including telecommunications. Appropriate information should be provided to the
public in order to avoid having them continuously checking the availability of
normal services during the rollover. This in itself might, on a global scale,
produce more severe disruptions than Y2K.
Finally, an important source of uncertainty, and therefore a potential risk, is the
state of readiness of most SMEs in this sector, for whom very little information is
available.
6.2 Contingency planning and rollover preparations
Extensive compliance testing campaigns at the component and systems level have
been carried out both on network elements, as well as on the interfaces between
networks. To date, no problems have been noted. Recently, the main activity of
telecommunication infrastructure providers has been to develop and verify
Business Continuity Plans (BCPs). The purpose of these plans is to minimise
unavoidable risks. Thus BCPs will not replace normal operational procedures,
which are already able to handle many types of problems, but would be an
additional overlay to cope with unforeseen situations.
At the international level, the ITU has played an important role in developing
awareness and providing support to telecommunication operators in their
preparations and planning for the vast majority of countries worldwide.
On the user side, most of the large corporate users have completed their task of
making their systems Y2K compliant. Current work is focused on testing and
verifying their BCPs. Conversely, the state of readiness of most SMEs is still
unclear, especially very small companies (<50 employees), of whom there are
many in the EU.
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6.3 Strategy for communication with public
The major telecommunication operators are establishing a variety of Command
Centres to assure the internal reporting of eventual disruptions within the sector
during the rollover, as well as external reporting to support and inform users, the
public, and the media. However, it is important to stress again that the critical
period is not only the actual rollover itself, but problems could be expected to
occur over several days, particularly the first working day. Hence, an increased
level of help desk and support services will be vital throughout this period.
6.4 Co-ordination activities
At the international level, the ITU Y2K Task Force has stimulated, organised and
carried out an extensive inter-carrier testing campaign, whose coverage and scale
is worldwide. The purpose of this campaign was to build confidence between
carriers in the 5 continents, as well as in their users. This campaign, which has
involved the execution of more than 130 complex test scenarios, will conclude
and the results made public by the end of October. Despite the voluntary nature
of this Task Force and of its initiatives, the level of collaboration and the
professionalism that have been exhibited in the different countries has been
remarkable.
Having concluded their testing campaign, the priority is now being given to
establishing an “Early Warning” co-ordination mechanism that will encourage
the timely sharing of information on disruptions on a global basis at an early
stage. To date, 50 carriers covering 30 countries have signed up to an agreement
in this area.
The ITU has conducted a systematic global survey and inventory of operator
readiness. These results are publicly available on the ITU Task Force web site
(http://www.itu.int/y2k). Currently the number of countries which have not
participated in the initiatives of ITU or have not provided information on their
readiness is very small. None of these are EU Member States.
6.5 Preparations in the EU
Many of the large national operators in the EU telecommunication sector are now
being reported as fully Y2K compliant. Specific attention is being paid to
emergency telecommunication services, which exist at national level for
government users in many countries. In the Netherlands, this emergency service
has been tested in detail, including a nationwide test and several local tests. The
introduction of a temporary, mobile-based emergency service to augment the
capacity of the emergency service is in progress.
On 27-29 September 1999, Telefonica, the Spanish national operator, carried out
a real-life test using actual traffic covering the region of Murcia. The successful
test included the year end rollover, as well as the changeover to 29/2/2000 and
1/3/2000 and no problems were reported. Telefonica is believed to be only
operator world-wide to risk a test under fully operational conditions.
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7 FINANCE
7.1 Information disclosure and Y2K readiness
The Financial Services sectors have made notable efforts to disclose information
concerning the impact of the Y2K changeover in their domain, and particularly
on the state of readiness of financial institutions. This activity has required the
involvement of all participants of financial markets, as well as the relevant public
authorities, regulators, and supervisors of these institutions.
On both international and European fronts, the sector has facilitated the exchange
of information by establishing an interlinked network of web sites. It is now
possible to obtain a good overview of the international preparedness of the
financial sector via the websites listed in the annex of this report.
In particular, many commercial banks and payment operators in the EU and
elsewhere have chosen to publish their readiness status through the Global 2000
website (http://www.global2k.com). This website is expected to shortly provide a
review of the contingency planning and event management preparations of the
financial services sector on a country by country basis.
7.2 The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European
Central Bank (ECB)
The creation of the ECB in June 1998, accompanied by the establishment of the
single monetary policy in January 1999, required the implementation of several
new IT infrastructure systems and applications, connecting the ECB with
national central banks (ESCB-wide systems). These systems were developed,
tested and implemented primarily between 1995 and 1998, at a time when
awareness of Y2K issues was already very high. Furthermore, the ECB does not
possess major legacy systems, hence has avoided the situation of having a large
volume of software produced during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in use.
This sophisticated technical infrastructure has been enhanced with applications
used to conduct monetary policy operations and to exchange statistical and non-
statistical information needed for monetary policy decision-making. A decision
was taken within the ECB to monitor both local and ESCB-wide Y2K
remediation and testing. The ECB is therefore conducting two interrelated,
parallel compliance projects. One concerns internal ECB systems and the other,
pursued jointly with the NCBs, will establish Y2K compliance across the
common systems and components used by the ESCB.
The general ESCB-wide Year 2000 compliance project will not ensure the
compliance of individual ESCB counterparties for market operations or
payments (typically private banks and other financial institutions in EU Member
States). The compliance of interfaces between the NCBs and their counterparties
remains the responsibility of the institutions themselves. The ESCB is
nevertheless confident that they are well prepared.
As a precautionary measure, the ECB is reviewing the contingency procedures
developed for the euro changeover in order to ensure their viability in the event of
any problem arising from the Y2K changeover.
The ECB and the NCBs plan to complete all end-of-day and end-of-year
activities, as well as the back-up of all systems and data, before midnight on 31
December 1999. In the event of problems arising from the century date change,
operational needs could be met through a consolidated set of pre-2000 data. To
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enable these operations and back-ups to take place before the end of the year, the
ESCB has decided to close the TARGET system on 31 December 1999. The
ESCB and ECB will also implement a moratorium on changes to IT systems of
the Eurosystem between 1 October 1999 to 1 March 2000, in order to ensure
compliance is not jeopardised by further changes.
Testing has taken place in two phases. Individual components of the Eurosystem
systems were tested for Y2K compliance in the first months of 1999. Internal
ECB Y2K testing was completed at the end of May 1999. On 19 June 1999,
following several months of intensive preparation, a successful bilateral Year
2000 test of ESCB-wide systems took place (European System of Central
Banks). This activity, completed ahead of schedule, involved both technical and
business areas of the ECB and national central banks (NCBs), and was designed
to test the correct functioning of systems on 3 January 2000 and 29 February
2000. The TARGET system was not included in this particular testing activity.
The ESCB also closely monitors the progress of the major retail payment
systems other than TARGET, in particular those settling their end-of-day
balances in TARGET. It is considered that all major payment and securities
settlement systems in the EU are making good progress with their Y2K
preparations and are expected to continue to function smoothly during the
changeover.
The Governing Council of the ECB has established an ESCB Year 2000 Co-
ordination Committee, consisting of Year 2000 co-ordinators from each NCB.
The Committee is responsible for co-ordination among the ESCB institutions,
and between the ESCB and international bodies dealing directly with Year 2000
issues. Its main tasks include analysing the suitability and feasibility of
contingency measures and the procedures for activating such measures, as well
as defining ESCB milestones to be monitored before, during, and after the
transition.
During the rollover period, the ESCB Y2K Co-ordination Committee will form
the core of an efficient communication infrastructure between the ECB and the
NCBs, established specifically to monitor developments throughout the transition
period. From the 31 December 1999 until the first working day in January 2000,
and also around the leap year date, an “early warning” network will be in place
to alert the decision-making bodies of the ECB. Should emergency situations
arise, the Committee will be responsible for consulting the relevant business
experts to expedite the decision-making process, ensuring that critical functions
can be performed. It will regularly exchange information on global issues
relevant to the Year 2000 transition, with particular reference to any major
unexpected events concerning the ESCB internal systems and infrastructures, as
well as the Eurosystem financial markets.
The ECB will participate in the Joint Year 2000 Council monitoring exercise at
year end, and will exchange information with the Council as a contribution to
mitigating Y2K-related risks beyond the Eurosystem at global level.
7.3 The TARGET system
The TARGET system is a settlement system, managed by the ECB, which
interconnects national RTGS's (the real time gross settlement systems of Member
States of the EMU). On a normal business day, TARGET processes an average
of 175,000 transactions representing a value of more than EUR 1 trillion. This
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includes 30,000 cross-border payments with an approximate value of EUR 350
billion. 200 net systems settle via national RTGS systems during each day.
Some of the transactions scheduled for 31/12/1999 will be shifted to 3/01/2000.
In the event of failure of other euro settlement services, TARGET is likely to be
used more intensively. Should TARGET not function smoothly on 3/01/2000,
there is the possibility of liquidity imbalances occurring, with the risk of interest
losses for banks and their customers, an impossibility to settle ancillary items
with banks unable to close risk positions, and many transactions might have to be
postponed to the next business day.
Bearing in mind that TARGET was implemented primarily to support monetary
policy and reduce settlement risks, secure processing of core transactions (high
value and settlement) should be given priority over the processing of a high
number of payments. Responsibility for national processing is left to individual
NCBs and the ECB, but cross-border processing will require common activities.
TARGET testing takes place in a dedicated test environment similar to the live
one. Tests are designed to establish the Y2K compliance of all hardware and
software components used for TARGET, including the national RTGS systems
and Interlinking components. After the NCBs and the ECB had completed their
internal IT and business functionality testing of the TARGET system, they took
part in multilateral business functionality tests. All the NCBs and the ECB have
participated successfully in at least one of four multilateral testing rounds. A
single Y2K error was found, related to the implementation of the receipt of end-
of-day messages in some systems. All NCBs concerned were able to correct the
software error immediately and re-test their systems.
A TARGET demonstration took place on 25 September 1999, in which all
national RTGS systems, EBA settlement systems and hundreds of credit
institutions participated. This final test has demonstrated the reliability of the
overall TARGET system.
The S.W.I.F.T. Customer Test System (CTS) was used during the multilateral
testing phase and for the TARGET demonstration. All NCBs and the credit
institutions involved have communicated payment orders using the S.W.I.F.T.
CTS, running with the relevant dates in 2000. S.W.I.F.T. has established a
mandatory Y2K test programme in which all customers must participate. These
tests were carried out by each NCB and the ECB, in parallel with the TARGET
multilateral business functionality tests.
Similarly, successful tests were carried out on the corresponding central banking
model (CCBM). The CCBM is a system for mobilising collateral across borders
in order to ensure the availability of collateral for monetary policy operations and
for payment systems needs. The CCBM is based on multilateral agreements
between the NCBs and the ECB. Since all messages flows are bilateral, Y2K
compliance testing was carried out by pairs of institutions which utilise computer
systems for this procedure.
Contingency procedures to process a limited number of system critical payments
were established prior to the start-up of TARGET operations in January 1999.
These procedures can cope with the unavailability of one or more NCBs and/or
the ECB, and have been revised and enhanced for Y2K failure scenarios.
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In August 1999, NCBs were requested to provide information on their domestic
contingency planning for TARGET operations. Comprehensive answers were
received from all NCBs in September. Links with the banking industry are in
place. Contingency processing is based on existing domestic tools which are
regularly tested. Priority will be given during the rollover period to major
settlement systems that settle via TARGET. All NCBs have contingency modes
in place and most are able to revert to “normal TARGET mode” in the course of
a business day. They are prepared to make temporary use of correspondent
accounts for Interlinking processing of certain “liquidity transfers cross-border”,
and to resume, once systems become available, normal TARGET operations.
Based on experience from testing contingency plans via the correspondent
accounts (CoCA) which took place in July and September 1999, procedures and
documentation are being revised. Further CoCA testing of contingency solutions
using correspondent accounts with various service providers will take place in
October and November 1999. The “normal” contingency processing, whereby
Interlinking messages are sent manually from the CBT, will also be drilled before
the end of the year.
To detect any remaining problems during the rollover as quickly as possible,
NCBs and the ECB will carry out connectivity testing on 1 and, if necessary,
also on 2 January 2000. Failure scenarios have been developed by the ECB and
the ESCB to be able to offer quick alternatives to TARGET members.
7.4 Central banks and Y2K financial risks
On 3.08.1999, the Bank of England announced that, in a bid to protect London's
markets from Y2K-related problems, it would increase the pool of securities it
will accept from banks as collateral by about 2 trillion pounds ($3.23 trillion),
representing a significant sevenfold increase.
The Eurosystem announced in August 1999 that it does not see a need to
introduce any systemic changes to its existing operational framework for the
Y2K changeover. From the outset, this framework has been designed to provide
maximum flexibility in the implementation of monetary policy, thus allowing
appropriate technical adaptations. In particular, the framework has a built-in
mechanism to accommodate any level of liquidity demand from market
participants. The aggregate reserve requirement of the euro area banking system
amounted to about EUR 100 billion in the first half of 1999, which provides a
considerable buffer to cover exceptional liquidity needs at the turn of the year.
The ECB also believes that the diversified payment systems infrastructure in the
EU reduces the risk of systemic problems. Moreover, the approximately EUR
5,700 billion assets in the list of collateral eligible for the refinancing operations
of the Eurosystem and the Correspondent Central Banking Model (which allows
the cross-border use of collateral) is considered to be sufficient eligible assets as
collateral even in exceptional circumstances. Additionally, a number of fine-
tuning instruments complement the main, longer-term refinancing operations of
the Eurosystem (outright purchases or sales, collection of fixed-term deposits and
foreign exchange swaps).
The Eurosystem’s facilities (marginal lending facility and deposit facility) offer
credit institutions of the EMU an automatic means of dealing with any potential
fluctuation in the demand of liquidity, and thereby limit any impact on short-term
interest rates. Finally, the ECB announced on 23 September 1999, that no new
Various contingency
measures already exist
to ensure normal
TARGET operations
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Liquidity issues are
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large refinancing operation will be initiated in the first week of 2000. This
decision will help to minimise potential problems for counterparties and for
financial markets which could result from the processing and settlement of such a
large operation directly following the changeover.
7.5 Payment systems
In Europe, the retail payment systems (payment systems operators, their member
banks and retailers) are generally considered to be ready. The few remaining
problems are known and being addressed, to allow electronic payments in
particular to function normally. Operator networks are Y2K compliant and are
co-operating together to exchange information. They will be able to rely on each
other’s facilities in the event of disruptions to systems or communication
networks (Visa on Europay and vice versa, satellite communication instead of
normal networks).
EU bank members of the retail payment systems are now 98 % ready, and the
remaining banks are in the process of completing their remediation and
contingency planning activities. In most EU countries, merchants have tested
alternate techniques for payment authorisations in the event that
telecommunications or connections to payment networks are temporarily
unavailable. Manual solutions already exist in the trade and distribution sector.
7.6 Retail and wholesale liquidities and related infrastructures
The end of the year is traditionally a busy period with a higher than usual
demand for cash, in this respect the end of 1999 is no different. The ECB, which
analysed the problem within the ESCB Y2K Co-ordination Committee, does not
see any need for individuals to hold higher amounts of banknotes during the
transition period than they would normally do at year end. Nonetheless, NCBs
have worked with commercial banks to ensure an additional volume of cash and
organise its distribution. Due to the need to produce euro banknotes for the end
of 2001, NCBs had already decided, independently of the Y2K context, to built
up excess stocks of national banknotes to cover a long-term period, up to 2002,
and free capacity for the production of euro banknotes.
NCBs have also worked together under the authority of the ECB to define
contingency plans in this area. NCBs are able in some instances to easily double
the volume of cash available (as is the case in Germany). Commercial banks
have worked with technology providers to convert their ATM terminals. The
testing of EU ATM networks is expected to be completed during Q3 1999.
Communication with customers will be a key strategy to cope with Y2K-related
liquidity issues. Information will be provided to bank customers to reassure them
of the compliance of ATMs, and to confirm that normal use can be made of
cheques and plastic cards for payments. Tensions on the liquidity market are only
likely to arise if there are concerns that Y2K might create disruptions with an
economic impact, thus the primary task of private and public authorities must be
to maintain public confidence. In the event of problems occurring, second level
event management preparations will ensure that contingency measures are in
place to cope, such as Central Bank mechanisms to recycle liquidity, extend
collateral, and implement Lombard facilities.
Retail payment systems
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7.7 EU banks and credit policy
Concerning credit management, Global 2000 has suggested that banks should
avoid taking hasty, unilateral decisions to withdraw or reduce the credit lines of
their business clients before 2000. Instead, they should carefully assess the Y2K
readiness of their clients, hold direct discussions where they have doubts, and
provide advance warning of any intention to take a negative decision.
The EU banks have given careful consideration to both the immediate short term,
as well as the medium to longer term, requirements of their credit policies. In
Finland, a highly automated financial sector has enabled banks to investigate the
preparedness of their corporate, as well as their small and medium size business
clients. They have concluded that there is a possibility that many corporations
could experience difficulties after the rollover. Nevertheless, they expect that
very few businesses will be harshly affected, the vast majority being well
prepared for Y2K. The Finnish banking community believes that if, in a small
minority of cases, corporate clients find themselves with longer term difficulties
due to Y2K, the bank itself would also be placed in a sensitive situation, and
would normally be obliged to provide further credit facilities.
The view of British bankers, a perspective shared by the majority of EU banks, is
that Y2K does not have a significant impact on their solvency assessments of
corporate clients. If clients are affected by Y2K but are nonetheless well-
managed organisations, banks will continue to support them by providing extra-
credit facilities. Y2K will not be a reason in itself to cancel credit lines.
7.8 EU Stock Exchanges
The Federation of European Stock Exchanges, which includes stock exchanges
within the EU and EFTA area, as well certain exchanges in Central European
countries, issued a statement on their Y2K readiness on 27 September 1999. The
assessment of Member Exchanges is that they are ready for the millennium
changeover, and is based upon several key considerations.
In general, these Exchanges are modern, high-tech enterprises, which have only
recently introduced their electronic trading systems in the past few years, hence
the inherent Y2K risk is considered to be low. Extensive testing has taken place,
both internally and externally, and regulators and supervisors have made
participation in Exchange tests a mandatory requirement in many countries. They
feel that they have gained valuable experience from the Euro changeover. Many
members have ultimate lock-out options to be used in the event that their systems
are endangered by unprepared business partners.
7.9 The EU insurance industry
EU insurers have agreed a common position through CEA (the European
Committee of Insurers), that only residual Y2K risks can be covered. If an
insured company has taken all the necessary measures to adapt and protect its
systems against Y2K-related risks, then associated damages can be covered
under the terms of their contracts. National federations and individual companies
have made special efforts to inform their customers, especially corporations and
SMEs, about Y2K risks and how they should be dealt with. In several countries,
however, millennium risks are being excluded from most policies at renewal.
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In spite of this common position, the instruments created by the markets vary
substantially between EU countries. Some Federations have recommended
exclusion clauses to their members, although individual companies are free to
decide on their own particular strategies. No specific collective measures have
been taken in Greece or the Nordic countries. In Portugal and Switzerland,
Federations have limited their involvement to delivering recommendations and
advice to their members. For others, Federations are also providing common
legal and technical support to help members to minimise potential financial losses
due to Y2K (Ireland, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands).
The In the Netherlands, a central emergency fund (500 million Euro) has been
created to cover special risks where policy holders can prove due diligence in
solving the Y2K problem. Organisations not participating in this fund need to
generate similar reserves for this purpose.
In France and Belgium, Federations have created collective permanent structures
for the monitoring of Y2K claims and their resolution. In France, the technical
platform “Co-ordination An 2000” has four key tasks. It provides technical
assistance, expertise support, legal co-ordination, and maintains a database of
information on Y2K claims. The Belgian technical platform offers assistance for
on-site assessment expertise to help insurance companies assess Y2K-related
claims and fight against potential fraud. Such organisations create a positive
synergy between professionals, saving time and sharing experience.
7.10 The macro-economic impact of Y2K
As the critical period approaches, countries are considering how to assess the
potential short- and long-term macro-economic impact of Y2K. In the
Netherlands, preliminary investigations on the longer term aspects have been
carried out, and further evaluations are foreseen.
During 1998 and 1999, several studies on this topic were performed. The study
by ING-Barings Bank in 1998 was cited by the OECD in its report on the Y2K
problem, and a similar action was undertaken by the CPB in 1999 (the Central
Planning Bureau is responsible for economic forecasting in the Netherlands).
Both predicted a minor impact, taking into account the overall activities in the
Netherlands, the possible macro-economic scenarios, as well as studies of similar
disruptions to production in certain industries and regions. The ING-Barings
report indicated variations between industries determined by the type of industry,
IT-dependencies, cross-border effects, etc.
The Dutch National Bank recently published a progress report on the Y2K-
problem in the banking industry in the Netherlands. A section of the report
concerns the credit-ratings of bank customers and the legal requirements for
banks to adjust their reserves in accordance with perceived risks. It concludes
that only limited adjustments are necessary.
In 2000, the macro-economic impact of the Y2K-problem will be evaluated by
the CPB, as well as the Dutch National Bank, as part of their regular activities.
As part of their ongoing monitoring, contingency planning, and crisis
management operations, the sectoral millennium platforms, the Government Y2K
Project Office, and the National Crisis Co-ordination Centre will collect
information on Y2K-related problems during a period from 1 October 1999 until
the end of March 2000. This information will be used to estimate the macro-
economic impact of the Y2K problem, as part of the overall evaluation of the
Y2K efforts in the Netherlands. The collection of information on actual Y2K and
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non-Y2K related failures is an integral component of their contingency planning
efforts.
The ECB has already analysed the short-term macro-economic impact of Y2K
and found sectoral effects created by the diversion of resources to Y2K actions.
In the short-term, this could induce some hoarding of products by firms, stocks of
food and other consumer goods by households, as well as the diversion of fixed
investment. These factors could have a monetary impact in the form of a
temporary increase in bank lending. The interest rate implied in the three-month
EURIBOR futures contract has traded above the notional interest rate. This Y2K
“spike” tended to grow over the summer, but has recently diminished.
However, the Y2K impact on short-term interest rates is significantly lower for
secured transactions protected by collateral. The yield curve for collateralised
instruments thus shows a far more regular pattern than the curve of interest rates
applied to unsecured transactions. This reflects a heightened awareness of the
credit risk considerations around the turn of the year.
7.11 International preparations
A meeting of Global 2000, the international organisation created by the financial
services industry (banking, insurance, investment firms and payment systems
operators) took place in Vienna in September 1999. The purpose was to review
how 11 recommendations adopted by Global 2000 members at their July meeting
in Miami could be implemented in Europe. Three major areas were considered -
liquidity management, credit management and event management.
Markets in the EU are in the process of finalising their country-based Action
Plans. On this occasion, delegations took advantage of the recommendations
provided by Global 2000 to review and make known to other banking
communities those actions which were complete, and to establish a schedule for
the remaining actions to be carried out. This exchange of detailed exchange of
information is reserved for Global 2000 members.
The Global 2000 will organise a restricted communication network during the
rollover period. Deutsche Bank has taken the initiative to organise this network in
a similar manner to the network of the Joint Year 2000 Council. Ten EU
countries will be part of this Global 2000 network, seven of which are also
included in the network of Joint Y2K Council financial centres.
The International Association of Insurance Societies (IAIS), sent a questionnaire
to all members in July 1999. 67 members replied, including the insurance
markets of 13 EU countries, with only Greece and Luxembourg not answering.
Although the IAIS published general results, the responses of EU supervisors are
amongst the most positive. Nearly all IAIS members collect or maintain
information on the Y2K readiness of companies within their jurisdiction. Most
members were able to provide information on the percentage of companies which
had successfully performed tests on their core systems, nearly half indicating that
90% of their supervised companies had done so, including some major insurance
markets. The number of insurance companies having made Y2K contingency
plans was slightly less.
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8 WATER
In general, the preparations of the water industry were late in starting. Of the
various industries covered in this document, the EU water industry is the most
frequently reported with target completion dates in the fourth quarter. The
production and distribution of water can be handled manually without the
support of IT-based control systems. Many plants are designed in such a way
that the supply of the network and the maintenance of supply pressure can be
made via storage tanks under using the natural downward gradient without
pumping. In others the geographical situation is relevant. For instance, in
Austria, mountains are the source of much of the water supply. The difference in
altitude between source and water tap means that pumps and electronic systems
are seldom needed, and the natural quality of the water is high, reducing the need
for complex processing. Thus, possible problems are likely to be limited to
recording mistakes, which may result in wrong billings.
Contingency planning in the water industry is similar to other infrastructure
sectors. Reservoirs will be full. There will be increased staffing and additional
training provided to personnel to carry out manual operations if necessary.
Emergency power supplies will be used as a back-up in the event of a loss of
energy supply.
In Greece, there are plans to have personnel equipped with various
telecommunication equipment, located at critical nodes of the water supply
network and prepared to take quick and effective action. In the Netherlands,
district water boards will decrease water levels by pumping more than the usual
amount of water before the millennium shift, thus the consequences for the
general public will be limited in the event of pump station failure due to possible
power outages.
The National regulations frequently exist for the water industry. By law, all
water companies in the UK are required to provide 10 litres of drinking water per
head per day for the duration of any disruption. In the Netherlands, the water
supply sector has a strict contingency regimen which requires 10 days of full
operation without new supplies of energy and chemicals (based on their own
back-up sources of power, and 20 - 25 days supply of fresh water without new
intake of water from known sources (mainly rivers).
Many countries reported that water supply and waste water management was one
of the most difficult sectors from which to obtain information. This difficulty is
primarily associated with the large number of small, localised companies which
provide these services, usually thousands in each country, generally under the
responsibility of local councils or regional authorities.
9 COMMISSION ACTIVITIES
9.1 Internal Situation:- see also :
http://europa.eu.int/comm/y2k/preparation/y2k_en.htm
The Commission continues to actively pursue the initiatives announced in its
Communication COM1998(102).
Top priority is being given to making its own systems and products compliant.
Regular meetings involving the Secretary General and Directors General keep
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progress under review through the Co-ordination Group on Organisation and
Management.
Since 1996, all DGs have been asked to include in their annual information plan
a specific plan to adapt their information systems to the year 2000, with priority
given in the budget allocations to executing these plans. Approximately 75% of
the Commission’s strategically important information systems are already
compliant or are being replaced by compliant systems, the remaining 25% are in
the final phase of adaptation. Particular emphasis has been placed on
contingency planning and product and contract auditing.
The verification of the underlying infrastructure (hardware, system software,
third party software) is well advanced and compliance will be achieved in time.
After the internal tests carried out successfully in the first half of 1999,
additional tests have been performed over the summer period for information
systems linked to external bodies in the areas of finance, customs and agriculture.
An inter-service group, led by the Secretariat General and with representatives
from all DGs, oversees the ongoing year 2000 activities within the Commission.
Its tasks cover mainly non-informatics subjects, such as the co-ordination of
contingency plans for assuring the continuity of essential services, legal issues
(Y2K effects oncontracts, warranties, obligations), general infrastructure aspects
(including buildings, security systems, lifts, and all related supplies) and
information campaigns targeted at Commission staff and the public. A special
effort has taken place over 1999 to assess whether data or products supplied by
outside firms or provided by the Commission are compliant, in order to keep any
adverse effects to the minimum, and to audit the accompanying contracts.
As regards other European institutions, the inter-institutional committee for
informatics (CII) continues to co-ordinate year 2000 activities so as to ensure a
common approach to the problem. The Commission has also organised in July a
symposium with Member States and SMEs on the adaptation of European
information systems to the year 2000 and the Euro.
9.2 External Activities:- see also
http://europa.eu.int/geninfo/keyissues/y2k/index_en.htm
Following up on the success of the previous EU Infrastructure Providers
Workshop which took place in April 1999, the Commission hosted a second
meeting of European infrastructure providers to discuss cross-border and cross-
sector dependencies relating to the Y2K problem. This meeting took place on 29-
30 September 1999, where more than 200 participants, including national Y2K
co-ordinators, regulators, and representatives of both international associations
and industry from more than 35 countries, met together.
The key sectors which were examined included finance, transport - aviation,
maritime, and rail, energy – electricity and gas, telecommunications, and nuclear
safety. Also discussed were aspects such as the continuity of supply chains,
strategies for communication with the public, and the preparations of national
emergency services. The results are summarised on the Commission’s Y2K
website.
The Commission has hosted several meetings with the Member State authorities
responsible for civil protection to discuss the Y2K problem and their plans.
Discussions have also taken place with certain sectors of private industry which
have potential safety concerns, such as the chemical and nuclear industries. The
Millennium celebrations at the end of 1999 are expected to be more numerous
...and work is expected
to be completed in time
End-to-end testing of
systems linked to
external bodies has
been conducted
Particular emphasis has
been placed on
contracts for goods and
services with external
suppliers, and those
supplied by the
Commission itself
Another workshop
examined the progress
of cross-border and
cross-sector issues in
critical infrastructure
sectors in the EU, and
elsewhere
Collaboration on
emergency planning
issues and crisis
management is also
taking place
30
and larger than usual, therefore, the fire and rescue brigades and emergency
services are preparing by increasing their capacity to respond.
All levels of responsibility from local municipalities up to central government are
involved in ensuring the continuous and safe functioning of the economy and
society, with local authorities being at the forefront in critical situations. The
system is based on the use of existing contingency plans to cope with various
hazards. These plans being reviewed in order to take into account possible
additional complications resulting from Y2K, repeated exercises are being
conducted, responsibilities have been clarified, priorities have been set for the use
of available resources, and IT systems carefully checked for compliance.
Countries such as the Netherlands have developed a reference scenario describing
possible disruptions in vital sectors and to public order and safety. This has been
used to train people to co-ordinate their actions by carrying out similar activities
simultaneously. A model contingency plan for the fire services was also based on
the reference scenario, and will be used by all regional/local fire services to
develop their individual contingency plans for Y2K-related events. A series of
national and regional exercises took place at the beginning of September.
Although there were no problems experienced with the technical systems tested,
technical problems occurred with the emergency phone service, and several
problems were identified in emergency plans. These problems will be fixed and
further exercises will take place.
For Italy, a comprehensive national contingency plan for the rollover is being
developed which involves all levels of the emergency services, the appropriate
ministries and regional administrations, the national Y2K platform, and local
infrastructures, to provide a co-ordinated response in the event of an incident.
This plan also covers public communication.
Typically, the chemical industry does not regard Y2K problem as an exceptional
event, since this industry must be prepared for critical situations at all times.
Nevertheless, companies are also conducting drills of their contingency plans
with a special emphasis on Y2K aspects. Although major problems are not being
detected, the need to co-ordinate emergency plans with local and community
services has been highlighted. Critical factors are the functioning of
telecommunications, electricity and heating, as well as water supply. It should be
anticipated that fire alarms may malfunction.
Although the implementation of contingency and emergency planning is not a
responsibility of the Commission, discussions have indicated that there is a
strong need to clarify responsibilities at different levels within the Member
States, as well as in the different infrastructure sectors.
10 CONCLUSIONS
The overall picture in the EU now appears to be one of general readiness, with
many companies anticipating “business as usual”, particularly the larger
organisations. A key success factor in reaching this situation has been the
avoidance of reinventing the wheel and creating new organisations or
programmes for Y2K, instead, organisations have based their preparations on
existing expertise, mechanisms, and resources.
Existing contingency
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Furthermore, industry has indicated that the Y2K problem has brought about an
unprecedented level of collaboration and co-operation between competitors and
sectors. Companies have recognised that they are all in this together, and that a
significant drop in confidence in a single organisation risks harming the position
of the sector as a whole. At the same time, some companies have become so
confident of their individual readiness that they are looking for opportunities to
take advantage of a lack of preparation by competitors in order to gain new
customers.
Nevertheless, important issues remain to be addressed prior to year end.
Given the enormous number of interdependencies present in current supply
chains, it is possible that there may be interruptions to the flow of goods and
services. A key matter of concern is the status of national customs systems,
where a lack of compliance could provoke disruptions throughout supply chains,
over which industry would have little control. Logistics now appears to be
somewhat less of an issue than was previously considered. The continued
availability of large stocks being held throughout supply chains in the EU has
surprised many who thought these operations had been revolutionised by the
advent of just-in-time manufacturing.
The verification of external supplier compliance remains an important, if also a
complex and time-consuming, task. For practical considerations, organisations
with numerous suppliers are obliged to conduct their assessment of vendor
readiness via questionnaires. Only a few are in a position to carry out on-site
inspections, and this action tends to be reserved for their most critical suppliers.
It is often more cost effective to focus on ensuring that there are effective
business continuity plans, including substitute suppliers, in place.
A vital step in continuity planning is the thorough testing of these plans in
advance, often by simulating a worst case scenario such as the loss of
telecommunications and power. Invariably, those organisations that have
exercised their plans have discovered various omissions and complications which
might have affected their ability to operate effectively in critical circumstances,
with many going on to schedule additional tests.
An additional critical link in supply chains is the business customer. In several of
the areas most concerned, such as banking, insurance, and electricity, the
behaviour or preparedness of these customers are also important considerations,
although in no way does this alter the legal and other responsibilities of service
providers with regard to their responsibility to ensure quality, continuity and
reliability of services provided over the period. Communication with business
customers and the provision of information to the residential customer remains a
key component of the Y2K strategies of these companies. In general, firms in the
EU have adopted a practical approach, assuming that those customers which are
well managed under normal circumstances are unlikely to be significantly
affected by the millennium bug.
Another issue is the actual timeframe of events. During the fourth quarter of
1999, organisations will finalise their contingency preparations, with many
deciding to implement internal “crisis cells” or “command centres”, also
becoming members of networks to share information on incidents which may
arise. Indeed, for certain organisations, their ability to detect and respond to any
disruptions which occur at the end of this year will be greater than ever before.
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Even so, the focus of these efforts is frequently on the immediate rollover period
of 31 December 1999 and 1 January 2000. For some industries, normal
operations and peak loads will occur on the first working day. Furthermore, it is
possible, even likely, that the full impact of problems could require days, weeks
or even months to become apparent. It is likely that many firms will retain a
certain level of monitoring and capacity to react throughout next year.
As expected with the year end approaching, organisations world-wide are already
experiencing problems associated with IT systems. Such incidents have tended to
receive considerable media attention. Although some problems may be directly
attributable to the Y2K problem itself, in other cases, they are only indirectly
associated, if at all. Newly installed compliant replacement software will
invariably contain bugs, incompatibilities between altered systems may manifest
themselves, the testing process for Y2K compliance or of contingency plans may
trigger existing bugs which had previously gone unnoticed, and users unfamiliar
with new or modified systems may generate errors.
These are all general problems associated with the implementation of IT systems,
which will occur frequently during the run-up to the new millennium, and which
thus far have proved little more than an embarrassing nuisance. In normal
circumstances, a substantial proportion of the problems reported to software
support centres are actually the result of mistakes made by users, or the software
working as intended. The volume of such incidents at the beginning of 2000 will
be a problem in itself, with inaccurate reports of errors wasting valuable
resources needed to resolve genuine problems, and potentially leading to
unjustified concerns on the part of both the public and the media.
10.1 Public Confidence
It is clear that the issue which represents the greatest challenge in the EU, as
elsewhere, is that of public confidence. In terms of public relations, Y2K is
unique in several respects. It is global in nature and has the potential to affect
everyone to some extent, it is not possible to provide or receive absolute
guarantees of continuity of service, and, the ultimate impact is unpredictable.
Whilst public awareness throughout the EU has continued to increase throughout
1999, the Y2K problem has thus far attracted less media attention in the EU than
in the US, and public concern is also generally at a lower level. Nevertheless,
governments are stepping up their efforts in order to ensure that the current level
of trust is retained throughout the short time remaining. Careful consideration is
being given to achieve a balance between keeping the public well informed and
providing unnecessary or inappropriate information which might lead to
confusion rather than understanding.
Many governments have already sent, or are planning to issue soon, leaflets to
householders providing accurate information on commonly asked questions.
Some have implemented distinct communication units within their national
millennium platforms. September 1999 has seen the publication by several
government Foreign offices (the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom), of information to their citizens regarding third country
readiness. In general, these assessments were based upon factual information
obtained from country authorities, without subjective assessment.
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All EU governments plan to put in place “national communication cells” at year
end, which will monitor and receive information on the national and global
situation, thus creating a mechanism to provide accurate and timely information
to their citizens, as well as other countries. Each country plans to ensure that a
reliable information source will be available to effectively respond to possible
incorrect or misleading stories which may arise. It is essential to have
authoritative information to distinguish between genuine Y2K-related incidents
and coincidental problems which may occur during the critical period.
It has already become important for organisations such as those in the transport
sector, which are beginning to announce their scheduling decisions for the year
end period, to be very careful to indicate where these decisions are being taken in
anticipation of low demand, rather than in expectation of problems.
It remains a concern that whilst private industry is collecting reliable information
on the readiness of their own sectors, in some instances the results are not being
given to governments or to the public, since they can only be obtained under
conditions of confidentiality.
People are likely to have reached a stage where they have formulated a particular
view on Y2K, and it may now require a significant effort to change their opinion.
This generally bodes well for ensuring that the level of public confidence in the
EU remains high. However, it may also mean that there is less interest in
continuing to attack the problem on the part of individuals or companies,
especially SMEs, who have decided that Y2K is a small problem that has been
overemphasised, or that it will be such an enormous problem that there is little
that can still be done to mitigate it.
An effective communication strategy is central to managing public confidence in
the final quarter of this year. Everyone has their own individual part to play.
Companies should focus on their investors and customers. Industry sectors
should address general market confidence, as well as their regulators. Ultimately,
it is at national level where governments must concentrate on understanding and
managing public confidence and expectations. A successful strategy requires a
sustained continuous effort from these organisations working together. Events
and the media must be closely monitored to identify problems which might
trigger concerns, and all must be prepared to deal with incidents which may arise
at any time without notice by providing factual, yet simple, information from
reliable spokespersons.
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11 ANNEX
The following is a list of websites from which additional information can be
obtained.
These websites are not under the control of the services of the European
Commission and the Commission is not responsible for the material contained
therein.
National and government information:
Austria http://www.austria.gv.at/ (government)
http://www.wifi.at/tub/2000/ (WIFI / Beratungsdienste)
Belgium http://y2000.fgov.be/ (government)
Denmark http://www.2000parat.dk (national site)
http://www.fsk.dk/fsk/div/aar-2000/year2000.html (Research
and Information Technology)
Finland http://www.vn.fi/vm/kehittaminen/tietohallinto/hko33.htm
(Finance)
http://www.kuntaliitto.fi/tietot/ (Regional)
http://www.tt.fi/yrityspalvelu/vuosi2000/ (Confederation of
Finnish Industry and Employers)
France http://www.premier.ministre.gouv.fr (Prime Minister)
http://www.an2000.gouv.fr (government)
http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/site/industrie/home/navi/page/indus
trie (industry)
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publicat/an2000.htm (justice)
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/sdsic/a2000/index.html (defence)
http://www.equipement.gouv.fr/an2000/1000.htm
(transport/logistics)
http://www.education.gouv.fr/actu/an2000/plan.htm (education)
http://www.diplomatie.fr/actual/dossier/an2000.html (foreign
affairs)
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/an2000 (interior)
http://www.agriculture.gouv.fr/index.html (agriculture)
http://www.jeunesse-
sports.gouv.fr/francais/misan2000/index.htm (youth/sports)
http://www.santé.gouv.fr/htm/pointsur/an2000/index.htm
(health)
Germany http://www.info-jahr-2000.de/ (national site)
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http://www.iid.de/jahr2000/
http://www.kbst.bund.de/j2k/ (Koordinierungs- und
Beratungsstelle der Bundesregierung für Informationstechnik in
der Bundesverwaltung - KBSt)
http://bmwi.gmd.de/y2k/ (The Y2K Problem in Information
Technology - Progress Report by the Federal Government)
Greece http://www.year2000.gr
Iceland http://2000.stjr.is/ensk/index.html (national site)
Ireland http://www.forbairt.ie/y2k/ (Department of Trade and
Enterprise)
http://www.irlgov.ie/ (government)
http://www.irlgov.ie/finance/y2k2.htm (Finance)
http://www.2000aware.ie/ (industry)
Italy http://www.comitatoanno2000.it/ (prime minister)
http://www.aipa.it/attivita[2/anno2000[12/ (public
administrations)
Luxembourg http://www.crpht.lu/an2000
Netherlands http://www.mp2000.nl/ (national site)
http://www.pmo.nl/pmo/ (government)
http://www.minbzk.nl (civil protection)
http://www.nibra.nl/pmb (fire services)
Norway http://www.aksjon2000.org/ (national site)
http://odin.dep.no/aad/publ/aar2000/index.html (Arbeids –og
administrasjons-departemented – AAD)
Portugal http://www.missao-si.mct.pt/P2000/index1.html (national site)
http://www.iapmei.pt/idex/informacao/ano2000.html (SMEs)
http://www.inst-informatica.pt/ANO2MIL/2mil001.htm
http://www.min-plan.pt/menu/tforce/index.html
Spain http://www.map.es/csi/2000.htm
http://www.sgc.mfom.es/efecto/efecto.htm
http://www.ipyme.org/temas/inforeu/interme.htm
http://www.euro.meh.es/mnoticias.htm
http://www.mma.es/2000.htm
http://www.cnmv.es/A2000/efecto2000.htm
http://www.consumo-inc.es/e2000/
http://www.msc.es/insalud/milenio/home_efecto2000.htm
Sweden http://www.statskontoret.se/2000/sfs.htm
36
http://www.2000-delegationen.gov.se/aktuellt/index_1.html
(national site)
Switzerland http://www.millennium.ch (national site)
http://www.efd.admin.ch/aktuell/2000/index.htm (public
administrations)
UK http://www.open.gov.uk/year2000 (UK plans/preparedness)
http://www.bug2000.co.uk (UK infrastructures – the results of
all assessments are provided on this website)
http://www.citu.gov.uk/y2000.htm (Year 2000 Team & Year
2000 Media Co-ordination unit)
For the energy sector:
Austria http://www.evn.at (electricity)
http://www.fernwaerme.co.at (district heating)
http://www.omv.at (oil/gas)
http://www.safe.at (electricity)
http://www.verbund.at (electricity)
http://www.veoe.at
http://www.wiengas.co.at (gas)
http://www.wienstrom.co.at (electricity)
Finland http://www.finergy.fi
http://www.fingrid.com
http://www.neste.fi/konserni/2000/index.html
http://www.gasum.fi/frindex_eng.htm
http://www.energia.fi/finergy/
France http://www.edf.fr (electricity)
http://www.gdf.fr (gas)
Greece http://www.dei.gr/dei-en.htm
http://www.depa.gr/eng.index.html
http://www.dep.gr
Ireland http://www2.esb.ie/htm/home/index.htm (electricity)
http://www.irlgov.ie/tec/energy/inpc.htm (oil)
www.bge.ie/htm/y2k/y2k.htm (gas)
Italy http://www.enel.it (electricity)
http://www.eni.it (oil and gas)
Luxembourg http://www.cegedel.lu
Netherlands http://www.energie2000.nl
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http://www.emp.nl
Norway http://www.enfo.no/index.cfm
http://www.statnett.no/y2k/index.html
http://www.npd.no/y2k/
Spain http://www.endesa.es/2000/index.htm (electricity)
http://www.repsol.es/webrepsol/esp/inversor/efecto2000.htm (oil
and gas)
http://www.miner.es
http://www.min.es/Informacion_anexa/14061999.htm
http://www.ree.es/indi2000.htm (electricity)
Sweden http://el2000.com/index.html
http://www.stem.se/om_myndigheten/y2k.html
Switzerland http:// www.strom.ch (electricity)
http://www.erdgas.ch (gas)
For the transport sector in general
Spain http://www.mfom.es
For the aviation sector:
International http://www.icao.int/y2k/ (International Civil Aviation
Organisation – ICAO)
Austria http://www.aua.at (Austrian Airlines)
http://www.austrocontrol.at (air traffic control)
http://www.flughafen-wien.at (Vienna Airport)
http://www.laudaair.com
Belgium http://www.sabena.com/public/about/y2k.asp
Finland http://www.ilmailulaitos.com/english/ (Civil Aviation Authority)
Germany http://www.dfs.de/jahr2000
http://www.dfs.de/Y2K
Greece http://www.olympic-airways.gr
Italy http://www.rai-enac.it/Y2K/indice.htm
Netherlands http://www.minvenw.nl/millennium (RLD)
Sweden http://www.lfv.se/sakerhet/y2k/y2krs03.pdf
Switzerland http://www.atraxis.com
UK http://infrastructure.bug2000.co.uk/sectors/air/
38
For the maritime sector:
International http://www.ship2000.com (joint web site of the International
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the United Kingdom P&I Club and
Lloyd’s Register)
Germany http://www.ism-center.de
Greece http://www.yen.gr
Italy http://www.trasportinavigazione.it/
Netherlands http://www.minvenw.nl
http://www.mpt.nl
Norway http://www.rederi.no/no/bibliotek/y2k/
Sweden http://www.sjofartsverket.se/frameset.htm
UK http://infrastructure.bug2000.co.uk/sectors/shipping
http:// www.mcagency.org.uk
For the rail sector:
Austria http://www.oebb.at
Finland http://www.rhk.fi/defeng.htm (Finnish Rail Administration)
http://www.vr.fi (Finnish State Railways)
France http:// www.sncf.fr
http://www.ratp.fr
Greece http://www.ose.gr
Ireland http://www.cie.ie/html/news/media/y2k.html
http://www.irishrail.ie
Italy http://www.fs-on-line.com/eng/index.htm
Netherlands http://www.ns.nl
http://www.mpt.nl
Sweden http://www.banverket.se/framtiden/ar2000.htm
Switzerland http://www.sbb.ch
UK http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/
For the road sector:
France http://www.equipement.gouv.fr/an2000/1000.htm
Greece http://www.oasa.gr (Athens Urban Transport Association)
Ireland http:// www.buseireann.ie/html/corpinfo/y2k.html
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http://www.dublinbus.ie/html/news/y2k.asp
Italy http://www.autostrade.it/pagine_1/english/e-homep.html
Netherlands http://www.mpt.nl
UK http://infrastructure.bug2000.co.uk/
For the telecommunication sector:
International http://www.itu.int/y2k (summaries of individual company
responses to questionnaires can be found on this ITU web site)
Austria http:// www.telekom.at (Telecommunication operator)
http:// www.mobilkom.at (mobile telephony operator)
http://www.maxmobil.at (mobile telephony operator)
http://www.colt.at or http://www.colt-telecom.com
Belgium http://www.belgacom.be/uk/about/operations/y2k/default.htm
(Telecommunication operator)
http://www.mobistar.be/fr/new/Y2K.html (mobile telephony
operator)
Finland http://www.sonera.fi/english/year2000.html (Sonera Oyj)
http://www.hpy.fi/yritys/vuosi2000 (Finnet Group)
France http://www.france.telecom.fr
Greece http://www.ote.gr (Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation)
http://www.cosmote.gr/e_mainpage1.htm
http://www.panafon.gr/en
Ireland http://www.telecom.ie/AboutTelecom/y2k.html
Italy http://www.telecomitalia.it/index.uk.html
Luxembourg http://www.y2k.lu
Netherlands http://www.mp2000-telecommunicatie.nl
Norway http://www.telenor.no/bedrift/ar2000
Spain http://www.sgc.mfom.es/efecto/efecto.htm
Sweden http://www.pts.se/aktuellt/2000-rap.pdf
Switzerland http://www.swisscom.com/2000ok
UK http://www.oftel.gov.uk/bug2000.htm
For the Nuclear Power sector:
International http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/y2k/ (International
Atomic Energy Agency)
Finland http://www.stuk.fi
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France http://www.edf.fr/html/fr/an_2000/index.html
Germany http://www.grs.de
http://www.bmwi-info2000.de
Netherlands http://www.energie2000.nl
Sweden http://www.ski.se/
Switzerland http:// www.hsk.psi.ch/aktuel.html
UK http://www.snl.co.uk/cgi-
bin/frame.pl5?loc=media/mn_factfiles_millenium.html (British
Energy)
For the financial sector:
International http://www.bis.org/ongoing/index.htm (Joint Y2K Council)
http://www.global2k.com/ (Global 2000)
http://www.iosco.org/year2000.html (international organisation
of securities supervisors)
http://www.ecb.int/ (European Central Bank)
http://www.iaisweb.org/ (international association of insurance
supervisors)
http://www.worldbank.org/y2k/ (World Bank)
Austria http://www.oenb.at (Austrian Central Bank)
http://www.oekb.co.at (Central Securities Depository)
http://www.apss.co.at (APSS)
http://www.bank.austria.com (Bank Austria Creditanstalt)
http://www.bawag.com (BAWAG)
http://generali.co.at (EA-Generali)
http://www.erstebank.at (Erste Bank)
http://www.raiffeisen-bank.at (RZB)
http://www.visa-austria.com (Visa-Austria)
http://www.staedtische.co.at (Wiener Staedtische)
http://www.wbag.at/index_english.html > Service > Year2000
(Wiener Börse AG)
Belgium http://www.nbb.be/sg/e/geninfo/p25e.htm (National bank)
http://fortisbank.com/fben/index.asp
http://www.kbc.be/kbc2000/en/index_en.html
http://www.bxs.be/bxs_gb.html > Year 2000 (BXS Brussels
Exchange)
Denmark http://www.xcse.dk/uk/nyt/pressemeddelelser/90226uk.asp
(Copenhagen Stock Exchange)
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Finland http://www.bof.fi (Bank of Finland)
http://www.rata.bof.fi/english/Faq/Faq.html (Finnish
Supervisory Authority)
http://www.hex.fi/y2k/index.html (Helsinki Stock Exchange)
http://www.vakes.fi/svk (Federation of Finnish Insurance
Companies)
http://www.vn.fi/stm/suomi/vastuual/vast01fr.htm
France http://www.afb.fr/pascfonb.htm
http://www.paribas.com
http://www.bourse-de-paris.fr/an2000/en/first/fs01.htm (Paris
Bourse SBF SA)
Germany http://www.bakred.de (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen)
http://www.bundesbank.de (Deutsche Bundesbank)
http://www.bav-bund.de (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das
Versicherungswesen)
http://www.bawe.de (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den
Wertpapierhandel)
http://www.exchange.de/index.html > Year 2000 Project
(Deutsche Börse AG )
Greece http://www.hba.gr
http://www.ase.gr>Announcements>Year 2000 (Athens Stock
Exchange)
Iceland http://www.vi.is > English (Iceland Stock Exchange)
Ireland http://www.ise.ie/senews/frcontent.htm (Irish Stock Exchange)
Italy http://www.bancaditalia.it
http://www.cipa.it
http://techinfo.sia.it
http://www.consob.it
http:// www.borsaitalia.it/ing/Y2K/Y2Ken.html (Italian Stock
Exchange)
http://www.cedborsa.it
http://www.isvap.it
Luxembourg http://www.bourse.lu/uk/an2000gb.htm (Luxembourg Stock
Exchange)
Netherlands http://www.dnb.nl
http://www.aex.nl>Millennium (AEX Amsterdam Exchange)
http://www.verzekeringskamer.nl (insurance)
Norway http://www.finans.dep.no
http://www.ose.no/y2k/ (Oslo Stock Exchange)
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Portugal http://interbolsa.pt/index.htm
http://www.bvl.pt/eng/Year_2000_en_main.html (Lisbon Stock
Exchange)
http://www.bdp.pt/bdp/indexi.html > Year 2000 (Porto Futures
and Options Exchange)
Spain http://www.cnmv.es/A2000/efecto2000.htm
http://www.ipyme.org/inipyme/prog4.htm
http://www.bolsamadrid.es/mse/infogen/y2k.htm (Madrid Stock
Exchange)
http://www.meff.es/news/index.htm > MEF and Year 2000
(MEFF RF)
http://www.meffrv.es/ing/indexi.htm > Year 2000 (MEFF RV)
http://www.bde.es/infogene/y2000.htm (Bank of Spain)
http://www.bancosantanader.bsch.es/efecto2000.htm (Bank of
Santander)
http://www.bbv.es/BBV/grupobbv/efecto.html (Bank Bilbao
Biscay)
Sweden http://www.fi.se/fffs/1998/fs9818.htm
http://www.omgroup.com/pdf%20files/om2k.pdf (OM
Stockholm Exchange)
Switzerland http://www.swissbanking.org/e/Pages/swissbanking.htm
UK http://www.bba.org.uk (information by the BBA on UK financial
sector preparations)
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk (contains the Bank of
England’s “Blue Book”)
http://www.londonstockexuser.co.uk/y2k/index.htm (London
Stock Exchange)
http://www.ipe.uk.com>bulletin board/news.html (IPE London)
http://www.liffe.com > Year 2000 (LIFFE)
http://www.lme.co.uk/summary1.pdf (London Metal Exchange)
http://www.fsa.gov.uk (FSA)
For the water sector:
Austria http://www. sbl.co.at
http:// www.magwien.gv.at/ma31
Denmark http://www.dkvand.dk/index1.htm
http://www.kl.dk/siab.asp?o_id=1869
Finland http://www.vvy.fi
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France http://www.generale-des-eaux.com
http://www.suez-lyonnaise-eaux.fr
http:// www.bouygues.fr
Italy http://www.comitatoanno2000.it/Documenti/Sicurezza
%20del%20cittadino/egea.htm
Netherlands http://www.mp2000.nl
Norway http://www.norvar.no
Spain http://www.mma.es/2000.htm
http://www.servicom.es/aes/aeas.htm
Sweden http://www.slv.se/vatten/index.htm
UK http://www.water.org.uk
________________________
